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Abstract  
 
Motivated by recent inconclusive debates on the natural resource ‘curse’ phenomenon, this 
paper reviews studies that have explored the causes and implications of natural resource 
endowments ‘curse’ within oil-rich developing countries (ODCs). Most of these studies find 
corruption, transparency, accountability, weak institutions and poor governance as causes of 
developing countries’ natural resource ‘curse’. However, recent studies identify a strong 
association between oil and gas multinational corporations (MNCs) as agents of globalisation 
and the resource-curse.  First, we consider the international dimensions of this relationship 
and how MNCs have an influence on the resources of ODCs. Second, we link the impact of 
MNCs and their natural resource nexus to broaden debates on strategic organisational 
practices. We show that globalisation creates the platform for the natural resource ‘curse’ 
phenomenon. Our findings offer new insights into the natural resource ‘curse’ debate. We 
expand knowledge on the traditional focus of the resource-curse literature to include 
globalisation and how ethical practices of MNCs could avert the ‘curse’ or allow ODCs to 
experience the advantages of their natural resource wealth.  
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1. Introduction  
The phenomenon of abundant natural resources being a ‘curse’ or ‘blessing’ within oil-rich 
developing countries (ODCs) has been widely studied and debated amongst researchers, 
academics and policymakers within the energy literature (Ayelazuno, 2014; Kolstad and 
Søreide, 2009; Öge, 2016; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Sovacool and Andrews, 2015). Most 
studies suggest that natural resources in developing countries do more harm than good. It is 
therefore, argued that most ODCs tend to experience slow socio-economic growth and 
development, a phenomenon termed as the “Dutch Disease” (Larsen, 2006). In these 
discourses, there are scores of recent studies, whose authors, alongside anti-globalisation 
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activists, all agree that the increasing rate of global economic activities, particularly by oil and 
gas multinational corporations (MNCs) such as Shell, British Petroleum (BP), Total, Exxon, 
Tullow Oil, Mobil, and others, exerts heavy pressure on oil resources within ODCs (Rudra & 
Jensen, 2011). In ODCs such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Chad, Angola, Libya, DR Congo, 
Sudan and Venezuela, MNCs have been found to have majority ownership and control over 
the oil and gas resources within these economies (Rudra & Jensen, 2011). This poses a 
challenge for resource-dependent nations to expand their global economic power, maintain 
domestic stability and effectively harness their resource wealth. Despite decades of this 
phenomenon’s existence, it is unfortunate to find that most studies have repeatedly focused on 
the traditional causes of the resource-curse, whilst the globalisation dimensions underlying this 
phenomenon have regrettably been neglected. 
Several studies on the traditional causes of the natural resource ‘curse’ (NRC), such as 
Atkinson and Hamilton (2003),  Auty (2002), Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008),  Davis and 
Tilton (2005), Humphreys et al. (2007) including Mehlum et al. (2006), find that oil discovery 
in developing countries, especially in Africa, rather than yielding sustainable socio-economic 
advantage to those countries, is considered to be a ‘curse’.  Most NRC studies find corruption 
(Kolstad & Wiig, 2008; Öge, 2016; Kasekende et al., 2016), transparency and accountability 
(Sovacool & Andrews, 2015), weak institutions (Mehlum et al., 2006) and poor governance 
(Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2006; Tsani, 2013) amongst others, as socio-economic growth and 
development impediments within ODCs. Kolstad & Wiig (2008) find that corruption 
permeating within ODCs impedes transparency and accountability resulting in the resource-
curse. Therefore, increased access to quality information and accountability could curb 
corruption and help to address the resource-curse. In this regard, Mehlum et al. (2006) also 
show that governance and institutional strengths partly determine ODCs’ resource-curse. They 
claim that these economies typically have poor governance systems and weak institutions and 
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inadequate skills, expertise and methods needed to manage the resources. Whilst there is 
inadequate political will and commitment to strengthen governance systems, and for good 
policies and reforms, the citizenry lacks interest, confidence and power to hold their leaders 
accountable for their stewardship (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2006). Similarly, studies into 
Ghana’s natural resources (e.g., Gyampo, 2016 and Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012) show 
shortfalls in legislative and institutional frameworks in Ghana’s petroleum sector, indicating 
significant inadequacies in the nation’s modern democratic dispensation.  
These notwithstanding, contemporary studies find some activities of MNCs as the primary 
cause of the resource-curse within ODCs (Adams et al., 2017; Kolk and Lenfant, 2010; 
Kopiński et al., 2013). These studies find that MNCs often implement various management, 
innovative international financing and profit maximisation mechanisms and strategies such as 
legitimisation, transfer pricing and tax avoidance to deprive ODCs from benefiting fully from 
their legitimate, mandated and legal share of their natural resource endowments. Additionally, 
MNCs lack corporate social responsibility (CSR) commitments (Frederick, 1992; Frynas, 
2005; Barraquier, 2011) including sustainably responsible exploitation of resources to support 
environmental preservation and sustainable growth and development (Barbier, 2011). This 
study seeks to expand the traditional focus of the resource-curse debate to include globalisation. 
We do so by explicating how, and the extent to which some activities of oil and gas MNCs can 
contribute to the NRC phenomenon; and how MNCs’ ethical practices could avert the ‘curse’ 
or rather work to ensure natural resources are instead advantageous for ODCs. Our findings, 
therefore, contribute to the resource-curse debate, knowledge and policy. The rest of the paper 
is structured to then include section 2, which has two parts and extensively reviews the relevant 
literature on the NRC from the perspectives of: (a) traditional views: corruption, transparency 
and accountability, governance and economic growth including institutional quality. 
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(b) international dimensions - globalisation in terms of MNCs’ management strategies: profit 
maximisation agenda, CSR commitments, legitimisation, transfer pricing and tax avoidance, 
rent-seeking behaviour and long-term licence lobbying, employment and human capital 
development, executive compensation, ownership structure and capital flight. Informed by the 
recent literature, section 3 discusses the subject matter of natural resources being a ‘curse’ or 
‘blessing’ in ODCs; while section 4 concludes the study and recommends policy directions and 
areas for future research. 
2.0 Literature review on the natural resource ‘curse’ 
2.1 Traditional perspectives  
  2.1.1 Corruption and natural resource ‘curse’ 
Corrigan (2014) sees the natural resource ‘curse’ (NRC) as a situation where the rewards 
generated from resource usage is lower than the total input cost. He therefore, assumes that 
natural resources impact negatively on both economic development and governance in weak 
institutional countries. Literature on the NRC suggests that many developing countries could 
not exploit their natural resource wealth to facilitate socio-economic growth and development 
of their economies (Kasekende et al., 2016). Kolstad and Wiig (2009:522) define corruption as 
“the abuse of public office for private gain”. Using the worldwide governance indicators’ 
(WGI) control of corruption index, Kasekende et al. (2016) find that Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) membership has not reduced corruption scores in member 
countries. They further use both economic theory and empirical study techniques to 
systematically analyse the association between corruption and transparency within ODCs. 
They explore how transparency could affect corruption and policy implementation in ODCs. 
They find that both education and policy reforms are key to processing, understanding and 
acting upon information. They conclude that whilst transparency is necessary, it is insufficient 
in reducing corruption and that such policy reforms should focus primarily on areas that could 
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specifically address the resource-curse. Additionally, Öge’s (2016) examine how EITI 
membership could avert corruption within its member countries. Using an interrupted time 
series and panel data analyses between 2006 and 2013, he shows that EITI membership 
improved aggregate data disclosure in its member countries during this period. However, he 
finds no change in corruption perception and undermines the conclusion that a reduction in 
corruption is unlikely as a result of EITI membership. 
Furthermore, Arezki and Brückner (2011) use a panel of 30 oil-exporting countries from 1992 
to 2005 to investigate oil rents effect on corruption and state stability based on the exogenous 
factors within-country variation to determine resource-curse. They show that oil rents increase 
corruption significantly and also affect political stability, but at the same time, improves civil 
rights and liberties. They associate these mixed findings with the political elite who wield the 
power and authority to extend civil liberties but minimise political rights during periods of oil 
windfalls in order to avoid redistribution and conflict. 
Though most oil-rich African countries (OACs) lack a strong track record of efficient oil wealth 
management, Ghana is most cited as a model of best practice (Standing, 2014). Hence, Standing 
(2014) investigates how corruption, and the mismanagement practices of local authorities and 
traditional leaders undermine the government’s policy of distributing mining rents to affected 
communities in Ghana. He argues that the normal antidotes of transparency and social 
accountability prescribed by the development community may not solve the resource-curse 
problem.  Whilst improved transparency and accountability is important, it is not likely that it 
could bring substantial gains. He finds that government policy and initiatives to increase 
transparency have been ineffective due to local corruption and a lack of accountability. He 
suggests an alternative policy of promoting access to international support and using the natural 
resource revenue to finance a universal cash transfer scheme. He concludes that a cash transfer 
scheme could be an ideal solution to the corrupt and inadequate governance systems in ODCs. 
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Aside from corruption, other studies find transparency and accountability as the NRC 
determinants.  
2.1.2 Transparency and accountability and the natural resource ‘curse’ 
The extractive industries transparency initiative (EITI) has been the international energy policy 
intervention organisation that seeks to mitigate the negative impacts of natural resource 
abundance by promoting transparency and accountability of resource revenues and governance 
(Adams et al., 2018; Corrigan, 2014). In this regard, Kolstad and Wiig (2008:522) define 
transparency as “public access to information”. Öge (2016) investigates how EITI membership 
and policy compliance could improve transparency and curb corruption in ODCs. He finds that 
transparency is narrowly defined by EITI. This leaves EITI’s objective of effectively promoting 
transparency as a measure to prevent corruption questionable. He, therefore, attributes this 
phenomenon to the corruption prevention failure amongst member countries. He suggests more 
comprehensive policy reforms on transparency to distinguish regimes that use transparency 
reforms for public relations purposes as opposed to genuine reformers.  Additionally, Adams 
et al. (2018) use 222 cases from 18 of Ghana's key petroleum stakeholders to investigate 
possible NRC escape factors. They find EITI membership and petroleum revenue management 
policies insufficient to avert the resource-curse unless they are complemented with improved 
country-level institutional factors including governance quality, government effectiveness, 
accountability, corruption controls, natural resource sustainability and effective accounting 
practices. The next paragraph discusses how governance and economic growth impact on the 
resource-curse. 
2.1.3 Governance and economic growth impact upon the resource ‘curse’ 
Sachs and Warner (2001) argue that countries abundant in natural resources ironically tend to 
grow more slowly than their resource-poor counterparts. The study shows that there is 
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insignificant direct evidence that omitted geographical or climate factors explain the ‘curse’, 
or that there is a bias resulting from some other unobserved growth deterrent. They conclude 
that resource-rich countries are most likely to be high-price economies, which perhaps means 
that these countries miss out on export-led growth. Similarly, using approximately 200 
countries in a panel study, Corrigan (2014) critically examines the EITI’s effectiveness, based 
on economic development and quality of governance. He finds that natural resource abundance 
impacts negatively on GDP per capita, rule of law, and the government’s capacity to formulate 
and implement sound policies in EITI member countries. However, the study shows that the 
effect of EITI membership on democracy, political stability and corruption is insignificant. 
Based on such mixed findings, he suggests that further studies be repeated 10 years later when 
enough time would have lapsed for EITI’s policies to have taken full effect.  
Based on the savings-investment transmission channel, Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2006) use an 
empirical study to build a mechanism that explains the long-term potential income reduction 
during resource windfalls. In their model, savings responds downwards to income from natural 
resources, and investments respond to savings with a subsequent fall in aggregate productivity. 
Resource affluence poses two counteracting effects on income. In the short-term, resource 
wealth increases income, but decreases income in the long-term through a crowding-out effect 
on knowledge creation. They conclude that the most mineral-producing countries do not keep 
incentives for savings and investment during positive resource shocks – a situation they 
attribute to the NRC. 
Additionally, Sovacool and Andrews (2015) qualitatively assess EITI’s performance of 
Azerbaijan and Liberia, the first two countries to achieve candidacy. They find that despite the 
EITI’s affirmation of the salience of reliable information and data regarding the extractive 
industries, attributing governance improvement causality to EITI is a misconception. 
Additionally, EITI discloses an inherent paradox on transparency virtues which confirms that 
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much damage from mining and hydrocarbon development is socially and economically 
unavoidable.  
Studying the perspectives on community representation within the EITI, Smith et al. (2012) 
examine the nature and quality of governance in community representation, including civil 
society engagement from a transnational large-scale mining perspective. They use experiences 
in the Anosy region of South-East Madagascar to explore functional relationships between 
government, mining business and civil society stakeholders. They find that state manipulation 
creates an equivocal legitimacy for certain civil society representatives which cause community 
disempowerment. The situation of appointing instead of electing local government officials 
results in an upward dependency hierarchy with a culture where most officials express similar 
views and political alliances. Consequently, community resistance is suppressed. They find that 
power relationships amongst mining industry stakeholders supersede efforts to achieve good 
governance through voluntary community engagement. They conclude that voluntary 
initiatives are unable to engineer good governance within the extractive industries sector. 
Despite these findings, studies continue to regard institutional quality as a great challenge to 
escaping the NRC. 
2.1.4 Institutional quality and the natural resource ‘curse’ 
Whilst Sachs and Warner (1995) find no relationship between institutional quality and natural 
resource-curse, Mehlum et al. (2006) claim that natural resources abundant countries form both 
growth losers and growth winners. They attribute such diverging experiences to differences in 
institutional quality. They confirm that abundant natural resources can reduce aggregate 
income within institutional grabber-friendly environments, whilst also increasing income in 
institutional producer-friendly environments. Building on Sachs and Warner's (1995) 
influential work on the resource-curse, their empirical test confirms that natural resource 
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abundance could only be harmful to economic development within countries with grabber-
friendly institutions. Therefore, countries having producer-friendly institutions would not 
experience any NRC. They conclude that natural resource abundance could hinder economic 
growth within grabber-friendly institutions but not within producer-friendly institutional 
contexts. Confirming their hypothesis, they conclude that institutions themselves play a key 
role in the NRC. However, this contrasts with Sachs and Warner’s (1995) claim that institutions 
do not play a role in the resource-curse.  
Although van der Ploeg (2011) find resource abundance to raise the real exchange rate, it 
discourages industrialisation. He opines that such phenomena are prominent in weak 
institutional environments that experience negative economic growth, corruption, and typically 
have underdeveloped financial systems. Additionally, and similar to the findings of Mehlum et 
al. (2006), van der Ploeg (2011) discovers that a resource boom engendered rent-seeking 
behaviour and civil conflict within weak institutional contexts. He shows that such 
phenomenon drives corruption, particularly within non-democratically governed nations that 
lack good policies. He concludes that, driven by weak institutional context, ODCs fail to invest 
their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive investments. Bhattacharyya and 
Hodler (2010) use panel data from 1980–2004 from 124 countries to study the relationship 
between natural resources and corruption, and how this relationship is induced by the quality 
of democratic institutions. They find that resource rents increase corruption within weak 
democratic institutional contexts and vice versa. They confirm that the association between 
corruption and resource rents is influenced by institutional quality. Furthermore, Tsani (2013) 
investigates the relationship between resource funds, governance and institutional quality in 
resource-rich countries. He finds resource funds associating with governance and institutional 
quality improvements as possible tools for addressing the resource-curse. This discussion 
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notwithstanding, recent studies find the activities of oil and gas multinational corporations 
(MNCs) to be key determinants of the NRC.  
2.2 Globalisation – oil and gas multinational corporations (MNCs) and the natural 
resource ‘curse’ 
This section reviews studies on ODCs that use institutional, legitimacy, resource dependence, 
stakeholder, transaction cost economics, resource-based view and agency theories to 
investigate how globalisation, with specific emphasis on MNCs and how they set the platform 
for the NRC within ODCs. Variables of significance include MNCs’ management strategies, 
such as profit maximisation agenda, CSR commitments, legitimisation, transfer pricing and tax 
avoidance, rent-seeking behaviour and long-term licence lobbying, employment and human 
capital development, executive compensation, ownership structure and capital flight. The 
subsequent section examines how these variables can influence the socio-economic growth of 
these ODCs.  
Progressively, businesses are becoming vital societal institutions worldwide, with remarkable 
consequences for the wellbeing of human society (Gabbioneta et al., 2013). Factually, ODCs 
lack the requisite capital to exploit and/or process their abundantly endowed natural resources 
to facilitate speedy socio-economic growth and development. In an attempt to attract significant 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, these ODCs demonstrate their commitment, 
responsibility and business sustainability within a business-friendly environment to attract 
foreign investors. Hence, oil-rich African countries (OACs) have recently been cited as the 
most capital-hostile regions (Adams et al. 2017) having experienced large volumes of capital 
transfers within the last two decades (Collier and Gunning, 1999; UNCTAD, 2018) through oil 
and gas business activities owned by MNCs. However, influenced by their profit maximisation 
agenda, these MNCs encounter significant corporate ethical responsibility dilemmas. These 
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include, but are not limited to, commitment to corporate social responsibilities (CSR), transfer 
pricing and tax avoidance, tax evasion, rent-seeking behaviour with long-term licence 
lobbying, profit expatriation, ineffective human capital development strategy, environmental 
degradation and sustainability issues (Jamali, 2010; Kolk & Lenfant 2010; Nyuur et al., 2014). 
Such developments undoubtedly result in untold devastating socio-economic consequences 
and decreased development opportunities on these economies, leaving them poorer than before. 
In such discourses, MNCs’ profit maximisation objective has been at the top of the recent NRC 
debate.  
2.2.1 The implications of MNC’s profit maximisation agenda (PMA) on the natural 
resource ‘curse’ 
Studies under MNCs’ corporate policies and objectives reveal their profit maximisation agenda 
(PMA) and its implications on host countries. Friedman (2007) sets the pace by arguing that a 
firm’s primary CSR objective is profit maximisation. Ferguson (2005) investigates MNCs’ 
initiated schemes and their effects on neoliberal global capitalism. He finds that recent capital 
investment by MNCs within OACs is territorialised with accompanying new forms of order 
and disorder that drive selective strategy to gain and maintain their hegemony of African 
resources. He argues further that such investment, largely owned by MNCs is mostly 
concentrated in petroleum extraction. Such capitalist investment ideologies held by MNCs 
impede the economic growth of these ODCs as their profit maximisation objective supersedes 
their CSR commitments.  
2.2.2 The implications of CSR commitment on the natural resource ‘curse’ 
The CSR commitment of MNCs has come under the radar of policymakers as the public and 
researchers intensify their calls for change. In this regard, Barraquier (2011), Frederick (1992) 
and North (1991) find that MNCs’ CSR compliance is influenced by imperatives of a trade-off 
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between ethics and business profit. In line with these findings, Ferguson (2005) mentions that, 
motivated by MNCs’ profit maximisation agenda, their present massive capital investment in 
ODCs has been affected by some current forms of order in relation to their selective investment 
strategy which results in CSR vulnerability. Therefore, MNCs encounter massive CSR 
dilemmas, concerning their CSR contribution to these ODCs compared to their CSR 
commitment to their home countries (Jamali, 2010; Kolk & Lenfant 2010; Nyuur et al., 2014). 
Wanderley et al. (2008) examine whether FDI inflows helps or hinders local firms’, and the 
relationship between FDI inflows and local firms’ uptake of CSR activities. Using results of 
hierarchical regression analysis of data from 227 samples of Ghanaian local firms, they find a 
substantial improvement in local firms’ uptake of CSR with corresponding improvement in 
FDI inflow. They conclude that institutional quality improves FDI and boosts economic 
growth.  
Jamali (2010) examines how the influx of MNCs and their polycentric and geocentric strategies 
in ODCs has affected their CSR contribution in such countries. He uses an interpretive research 
methodology to examine the CSR orientations of a sample of MNC subsidiaries in Lebanon. 
He discovers diffusion and dilution of global CSR patterns in developing countries regarding 
specific subsidiary endowments and host market characteristics. He concludes that MNCs’ 
CSR commitment level is low in developing countries, which directly affects their growth 
prospects. Exploring how MNCs report on CSR and conflict in three Central African countries, 
Kolk and Lenfant (2010) argue that MNCs in ODCs encounter CSR dilemmas, with specific 
regard to the contribution they are able and willing to offer in other regions as against their 
home countries. They find MNCs’ CSR report to be generic and representative of a high CSR 
vulnerability which negatively affects the economic growth of host countries. This is 
demonstrative of MNCs’ corporate social irresponsibility (CSIR) to their host countries. 
Confirming this, Wanderley et al. (2008) suggest that country of origin and industry sector 
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together have great influence on CSR information disclosure. In addition, institutional theory 
associates MNCs’ organisational ethical vulnerability (Brown 2013; Ullah et al., 2018) within 
OACs to insufficient country-level institutional factors (Adams et al. 2018), institutional voids 
or weak institutional arrangements (Amaeshi et al., 2016; Castellacci, 2015).  
From the ‘institutional theory’ perspective, Amaeshi et al.  (2016) find CSR in developing 
countries is characterised by problematic and non-enabling institutional contexts. In this guise, 
firms may hide behind weak institutional structures and relegate their CSR to the background. 
Hence, we argue that MNCs’ PMA succeeds within ODCs where weak institutional structures 
abound.  Such weak institutional context therefore, holds the implication that legal, regulatory 
and judicial systems within ODCs are not strong enough to hold MNCs accountable for their 
actions and inactions. Odera et al. (2016) investigate the quality of social and environmental 
disclosures by oil and gas MNCs (MNCs) and find that low quality social and environmental 
disclosures drive their business profit maximisation agenda. Agreeing to this finding, Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013) show that such practices are engineered by ‘institutional voids’ within 
ODCs, especially Africa. Similarly, Ackah-Baidoo (2012) shows that weak institutions within 
African countries account for the poor governance systems which puts less pressure on 
companies to comply with regulations to embrace and honour their CSR commitments. It is in 
this respect that Idemudia (2012) and Contractor (2016) argue that MNCs hide behind weak 
institutional contexts, and implement their strategic profit maximisation agenda, which causes 
ODCs to lose hundreds of billions (USD) annually. Furthermore, in his study on the false 
developmental promise of oil and gas for MNCs’ CSR, Frynas (2005) finds that CSR non-
compliance and the oil and gas sector’s revenue mismanagement impact negatively on the 
socio-economic growth and development of ODCs. This implies that MNCs’ CSR non-
compliance significantly impact upon local economic development policies and programmes. 
Therefore, many social and community initiatives, together with expected social welfare 
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projects and programmes, would never fully materialise as the principles for responsible 
management remains an optional extra in MNCs’ strategic toolkit.  
There have been frequent concerns regarding the extent to which those MNCs involved in the 
oil and gas industry could, and are willing to, contribute through CSR activities to sustainable 
development in ODCs. There exists, therefore, enough evidence to show that MNCs operating 
within ODCs create wealth for themselves, by means of some artificial and cosmetic 
adjustments to camouflage their reports. This results in a misrepresentation of information to 
the users of the reports which reflects the concern of inadequate corporate stakeholder 
accountability (Gray, 2013, 1992). Such MNCs’ actions support the argument that ODCs are 
vulnerable and exploitable (Belal, 2013, 2015). Hence, Adams et al. (2017) show that by the 
end of the current decade, most African countries would celebrate their 50th independence 
anniversary, but at the same time would be attending to the risks ‘manufactured’ by MNCs 
operating in such countries.  
Similarly, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) investigate the association between corporate 
governance and CSR within the South African economy. They argue that ‘economic neo-
institutional theoretical applications’ underpin economic activities and engagement. They 
show that strong institutional structures facilitate good corporate governance (CG) practices 
which support socio-economic growth. Such increasing CSR importance in the contemporary 
competitive business environment motivated García‐Rodríguez et al. (2013) to investigate how 
social and environmental contexts can influence MNCs’ CSR commitments within ODCs. 
Using a case study, they examine an environmental management system (EMS) in Luanda Oil 
Refinery in Angola. They find that MNCs’ CSR commitment would be a great asset to socio-
economic growth and development in ODCs if they integrate CSR programs into their business 
strategy. They conclude that MNCs’ operations affect their operational and social 
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environments such that their CSR non-compliance impacts negatively on the socio-economic 
growth and development of such economies.   
Additionally, Jo et al. (2015) and Wang and Berens (2015) find that most high-performing 
global investment companies resort to CSR as a socially responsible investment philosophy, 
and this has a strong positive impact on socio-economic growth and development in emerging 
economies. From the same line of study, the findings of Bhardwaj et al. (2018) and Sun et al. 
(2018) confirm that CSR compliance is profitable and supports businesses, economic growth 
and development. Furthermore, George et al. (2016) show that the contribution of MNCs 
towards the socio-economic growth of ODCs is insufficient. They opine that Africa should 
make full use of the intellect and expertise of entrepreneurs and corporate executives. MNCs 
should be held accountable for the externalities of their business activities and the authors 
encourage MNCs to offer due attention to CSR compliance. It follows that the PMA of MNCs 
operating in an institutionally void context can create CSR vulnerability and unethical business 
practices. This supports the argument that institutional strength determines CSR compliance or 
vulnerability (Jones, 1999). 
Frynas (2010) evaluates the potential of the recent CSR agenda for addressing issues on societal 
governance. He analyses revenue transparency, as studies find it to be the principal governance 
challenge that EITI seeks to address. He finds that addressing the impact of corporate activities 
and governance challenges is crucial. He affirms that though MNCs’ activities may have 
marginal contribution in ODC’s, their aggregate contribution (influenced by their PMA and 
business externalities) to ‘real economic growth’ might have contributed to ODCs’ governance 
and socio-economic growth failures. The above discussions show that MNCs’ inadequate CSR 
commitment contributes immensely to the resource-curse which has slowed the socio-
economic growth of ODCs. Other studies, however, find MNCs’ legitimisation as a 
determinant of the NRC. 
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2.2.3 The implications of legitimisation on the natural resource ‘curse’ 
From the ‘legitimacy perspective’, Suchman (1995) shows that CSR commitment improves 
legitimacy, efficiency, corporate reputation and image, including the provision of critical 
resources. It is in this vein that Du and Vieira (2012) argue that, being a controversial industry, 
oil MNCs use a variety of tactics to undertake CSR activities to gain legitimacy. However, in 
situations where MNCs would comply with their CSR provisions, they do so for the purposes 
of corporate legitimacy, which enhances their corporate reputation and image. In addition to 
their inadequate CSR contribution, MNCs’ transfer pricing and tax avoidance practices have 
attracted significant attention from researchers.  
2.2.4 The implications of transfer pricing and tax avoidance on the natural resource 
‘curse’  
From the ‘transaction cost economics’ perspective, Dobers and Halme (2009), Hilson (2012), 
Jones (1995) including Morck et al. (2008) examine MNCs’ transfer pricing and tax avoidance 
behaviours. They show common evidence that MNCs operating in ODCs pursue rigorous cost 
reduction strategies including supply chain accounting, outsourcing, inappropriate pricing 
techniques, rigorous tax planning and organised tax avoidance strategies including transfer 
pricing for the purposes of profit maximisation and capital flight. Studying CSR and tax 
avoidance, Sikka (2010) shows that MNCs’ organised tax avoidance has negative effects on 
socio-economic growth and entire human survival. He argues that firms legitimise their social 
credentials through responsible and ethical conduct promises. He however, laments that such 
publicly espouse claims are not aligned with the realities of organisational culture. 
Consequently, such differences between corporate ‘talk’ and actual practice impact negatively 
on the welfare of the company, its executives and employees. He concludes, with demonstrable 
evidence, that although MNCs promise responsible conduct, they usually end up in situations 
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of tax avoidance and tax evasion to the detriment of ODCs’ socio-economic growth and 
development.  
Similar to the above research is the study of the dark side of transfer pricing and its implications 
on tax avoidance and wealth retentiveness by Sikka and Willmott (2010). They argue that 
transfer pricing is a mechanism being used by MNCs, including a group of related firms, to 
optimally allocate costs and revenues amongst divisions, departments and subsidiaries. They 
find that such transfer pricing activities misrepresent the real values of transactions, drive 
wealth retention processes, facilitate a firm’s tax avoidance and motivates capital flight. They 
opine that transfer pricing calculations are influenced by the politico-economic contexts of their 
development and use. The globalisation perspective shows that MNCs operating in ODCs 
adopt transfer pricing practices to increase private gains which result in ODCs’ relative social 
impoverishment through avoidance of public tax payments.  
Dowling (2014) studies the curious case of corporate tax avoidance. He finds that corporate 
tax payment was the basic measurable yardstick for a firm’s patriotism in honouring its social 
obligations. Some successful and able firms deliberately and actively adopt certain legally 
acceptable measures that are hidden from public view in order to continually avoid tax 
payment. Contractor (2016) investigates seven tax-avoidance techniques used by MNCs to 
drive this corporate behaviour. He argues that a huge number of MNCs around the world seek 
local optimisation of revenues and perceived different countries as centres of profit 
maximisation. He finds that MNCs placed corporate tax avoidance at the centre of their global 
profit maximisation strategy. He shows that the strategic behaviour of MNCs hindered the 
economic growth of ODCs, their global operations, their supply chains, and their location 
decision making.  
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North (1991) and Jones (1995) study the relationship between CSR and profitability. They find 
that quality institutions have a greater likelihood of influencing greater productivity to 
maximise business profits. Furthermore, Jones (1995) affirms that in determining economic 
performance, transaction costs are critical. As an extension to this argument, Du and Vieira 
(2012) show that MNCs adopt supply chain accounting, including certain price violation 
strategies, in order to maximise profits to show their managerial effectiveness and efficiency, 
and to please their principals. Confirming this, Aupperle et al. (1985), Aupperle and Pham 
(1989) and Dowling (2014) show that MNCs often indulge in rigorous tax avoidance and tax 
evasion practices including income-shifting strategies in a bid to increase revenues. Such 
practices common among all MNCs obviously contribute to the NRC in ODCs. 
In addition, Sikka (2003) considers globalisation as the most advanced phase of capitalism and 
note that tax havens are an integral part of globalisation. He finds that capitalism is inherently 
‘crisis-ridden’ since MNCs utilise offshore financial centres (OFCs; also called tax havens) to 
facilitate the mobility of capital around the world. Policies aimed at inducing tax avoidance, 
tax evasion, capital flight, instability and CSR non-compliance; including degradation of 
regulation, seem to have become the hallmarks of these global corporations. Similarly, Cash 
(2012) examine governance, transparency and CSR in the Republic of Chad. He concludes that 
amongst other factors, the international investor profitability agenda seems to have been in 
contrast with their CSR initiatives in weak institutional economies. He shows that practices, 
such as oil revenue mismanagement and tax avoidance, impede socio-economic growth and 
this result in ‘Dutch Disease’ like symptoms which facilitate slow socio-economic growth. The 
above-stated research arguments, discourses, opinions and findings suggest that MNCs’ PMA 
influence their CSR commitment which drives the resource-curse phenomenon. However, 
studies also find MNCs’ rent-seeking behaviour and licence lobbying to be contributing to the 
NRC.  
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2.2.5 Implications of rent-seeking behaviour and long-term licence lobbying on the 
natural resource ‘curse’ 
 
Kolk and Lenfant (2010) find that there is a prevalence of MNCs lobbying sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) governments to provide very long-term operational licenses and tariff protections. This 
implies that, irrespective of their performance, MNCs would play to their advantage as against 
the interest of the host nation. Additionally, investigating the resource-curse problem, Kopiński 
et al. (2013) find ODCs more vulnerable to MNCs’ oil and gas revenue ‘rent-seeking 
behaviour’. Ackah-Baidoo (2012) investigates enclave development and offshore CSR’ 
implications on oil-rich African countries (OACs) and shows that MNCs’ PMA impedes 
proactive CSR engagement. He laments that MNCs encourage the corrupt practices of public 
officials and discourage natural resources innovations through their rent-seeking behaviour. 
These antecedents contribute immensely to the ‘Dutch Disease’ and the NRC. 
Based on the ‘resource dependency theory’, Idemudia (2012) argues that Nigeria is often seen 
as a poster child for resource-rich developing countries that have suffered the resource-curse 
phenomenon. He indicates that Nigeria’s Oil Producing Area Development Commissions 
(OPADCs) have failed to improve the well-being of the people in oil producing communities 
in Nigeria. In this sense, Adegbite et al. (2012) argue that such phenomenon is mostly caused 
by the politics of Nigeria’s shareholder activism. OPADCs have failed to amend existing 
opportunities and incentives provided for rent-seeking petroleum MNCs whose CSR non-
compliance contributed to Nigeria’s socio-economic growth failures (Idemudia 2012). 
Consequently, Watts (2006),  Peteraf (1993),  Wernerfelt (1984) and Frynas and Paulo (2007) 
agree that whilst ODCs are said to be an empire of abundant natural resources, capitalist 
dispossession, the scramble for Africa’s oil and MNCs’ CSIR significantly contribute to ODCs’ 
NRC and the slow socio-economic growth and development. Aside from these findings, studies 
indicate that employment and human capital development contribute to the NRC. 
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 2.2.6 Implications of employment and human capital development on the natural 
resource ‘curse’ 
The ‘resource-based view’ (RBV) protagonists argue that businesses should be analysed from 
the resource side rather than the product side (Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). They advocate 
that strategic management options naturally emerge from the resource perspective. This is in 
line with the opinion that MNCs’ community involvement through employment creation for 
local people, and continual employee training or human capital development (HCD), support 
and improve legitimacy, sustainability and economic growth (Liu et al., 2013). However, 
MNCs primarily reserve their most senior corporate positions for expatriates who are paid 
substantial packages, remunerations and compensations. This is done at the expense of the ‘can 
do’ local employees who tend to understand the local industrial terrain better, and who do the 
greater part of the jobs. This may be due to local peoples’ seemingly inadequate knowledge 
and training to enable them to compete with expatriates. Such industrial discrimination 
occasionally results in industrial unrests which affects productivity and performance and the 
huge capital flights involved have serious resource-curse and socio-economic growth 
implications. 
Employee training is an organisation’s investment. It generates valuable assets including 
quality leadership and positive social reputation (Wu et al., 2015) which leads to competitive 
advantage and potentially higher returns (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006). However, MNCs’ 
decisions regarding who to be trained tend to be selective. MNCs’ senior managers benefit 
from high-profile training, most of which is internationally undertaken with a huge cost, whilst 
local employees undergo such programs occasionally and locally. Ironically, during voluntarily 
or involuntary redundancies, such local employees may not find another job as good as their 
previous one, due to lack of continuous professional development (CPD). Arguably, it is 
suggested that employees’ CPD could reduce political costs (such as litigation and 
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nationalisation), labour frictions and customer boycotts (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
However, considering such MNCs’ discriminatory employee training practices, the objective 
to develop its human capital to acquire core competencies, enhanced skills and intangible assets 
aimed at improving and preserving corporate performance and legitimacy (Wernerfelt 1984) 
would be relegated to the background. Hence, such unskilled and low-waged local MNC’s 
employees, considering their meagre income, investment capabilities, income tax liabilities, 
purchasing power and consumption pattern, may not contribute meaningfully to socio-
economic growth and development. Therefore, the ODC’s non-replaceable oil resource may 
be more of a ‘curse’ than a ‘blessing’ prior to depletion, or when depleted, due to inadequate 
local employees’ training and meagre salaries. 
Similarly, Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) examine a firm’s stakeholders’ interest and community 
involvement. They wondered whether shareholders’ interests must be a firm’s only concern, or 
attention must be directed to all stakeholders. In discussions on a firm’s commitment to socially 
responsible activities, including how and the extent to which such commitment contributes to 
a firm’s wealth, the ‘stakeholder theory’ (Freeman 1984) is the most used approach. From a 
firm’s social commitment perspective, the stakeholder theory suggests that a firm’s CSR 
investment in employees represents the value relevance of a firm’s nonfinancial information 
(Amir and Lev, 1996; Shevlin, 1996). It is against this backdrop that Greening and Turban 
(2000) confirm that job seekers may prefer to work for such firms who consider CPD and HCD 
as part of their CRS investments, as opposed to those firms that put less premium on HCD. 
Therefore, MNCs must consider the interest of their all stakeholders. This would improve the 
natural resource benefits to these ODCs. The next paragraph discusses executive compensation, 
ownership structure, capital flight and their implications on the NRC. 
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2.2.7 Executive compensation, ownership structure, capital flight and their implications 
on the natural resource ‘curse’’ 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that ‘agency problem’ may hinder CSR commitment 
because of the managerial power and discretion exercised in big listed firms. Minnick and 
Rosenthal (2014) argue that MNCs’ ownership structure and the design of consistently high 
executive compensation arrangements have some implications on MNCs’ CSR commitments, 
cash flow, dividend payouts and capital flight. They cite that such a ‘crony capitalism’ 
phenomenon where controlling shareholders expropriate minority shareholders are machinated 
by MNCs operating in ODCs. This claim is supported by low CSR investments and fluctuating 
cash flow patterns which give way to huge executive compensation, well-crafted multiple 
blockholders including crafted executive stock option offers and payments of high dividends 
(Minnick and Rosenthal, 2014). Hence, He et al. (2012) find that MNCs’ ownership structure, 
executive compensation and dividend policy affect their CSR commitment. Such firm-level 
practices of MNCs contribute greatly to the resource-curse phenomenon, which ultimately 
impede the socio-economic growth opportunities within ODCs.  
It is worth noting that factors that influence the NRC are inexhaustive in this piece of work.  
Other studies identify causes to include resource constraints, economic and governance 
challenges of market entry, and the nature and complexities of CSR activities in addition to 
responsible investment and fair trade (Amaeshi et al. 2016; Nyuur et al., 2016). In view of the 
literature reviewed thus far, we pose a hypothetical question: is there a natural resource ‘curse’?   
3.1 ‘Curse’ or ‘blessing’? 
Concerning the NRC, and escape from the resource-curse cycle, four studies, amongst others, 
immediately come to mind. In response to this hypothetical question, Papyrakis and Gerlagh 
(2004) empirically examine the resource-curse transmission channels and how the natural 
resource abundance can impact directly and indirectly on economic growth. They find natural 
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resources to impact negatively on growth when it is captured in isolation. However, it has 
positive direct effects on growth when certain factors, including corruption, investment, 
openness, terms of trade, and level of education are considered. They find that the negative 
indirect effects of natural resources on growth outweigh the positive direct effect by a 
reasonable order.  
Incidentally, Boschini et al. (2007) also pose a similar hypothetical question – “resource curse 
or not: a question of appropriability”? They argue that the interaction between institutional 
setting and the types of resources a country owns is crucial in suggesting whether natural 
resources are good or bad for a country's development. They argue that, for economic and 
technical reasons, some natural resources have more potential to create problems such as rent-
seeking and conflicts than others. However, this foreseeable problem could be avoided where 
strong and quality institutions exist. This study clearly shows the ultimate importance of strong 
institutions towards escaping the natural resource ‘curse’ (Adams et al., 2018). 
Similarly, van der Ploeg (2011) asks: “are natural resources a curse or a blessing”? Responding 
to his question in his empirical studies, he concedes that either outcome is a possibility. He 
surveys various hypotheses and supporting evidence to understand the reasons why some 
countries benefit whilst others suffer from the NRC. He considers a resource bonanza, which 
he said can influence real exchange rate appreciation, poor growth prospects, and de-
industrialisation. He indicates that such variables prevail in weak institutional contexts. He 
further hypothesises that resource abundance motivates rent-seeking behaviour and propels 
corruption, particularly in non-democratic countries. Moreover, ODCs appears not to 
successfully turn around their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive 
investments. He then concludes that for ODCs to escape the NRC, institutional quality, rule of 
law, democratic governance, innovative re-investment of resource revenue and well-developed 
financial systems could not be compromised. It is indeed established wisdom that improvement 
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of financial systems in ODCs would invariably contribute to efficient capital allocation to the 
oil and gas sector (Levine et al. 2000; Beck et al, 2000). Table 1 and 2 provide a summary of 
literature, and present the views of various school of thoughts on causes of natural resources 
curse in developing countries. In Figure 1 we present a summary of the traditional and 
international concepts/theories which outline the reasons for the resource-curse in ODCs. 
These conceptual/theoretical paradigms inform the discussion and findings of this study.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here 
   ------------------------------------ 
----------------------------------- 
Insert table 2 about here 
    ------------------------------------ 
----------------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
3.2 Discussion  
In reviewing the studies that explore the causes and implications of the natural resource ‘curse’ 
within ODCs, three things have become apparent. First, most of these studies find an abundance 
of natural resources endowments in developing countries as a ‘curse’ rather than a ‘blessing’. 
Second, the studies find a strong relationship between the resource ‘curse’ and a country’s level 
of corruption, transparency, accountability, institutional strength and efficiency of governance. 
Interestingly, studies that associate the resource ‘curse’ to corruption agree that corruption has 
been a pervading fundamental socio-economic growth challenge within developing countries 
generally.  Hence, its elimination could help resolve the NRC. Whilst corruption is generally 
known as a global problem, additional capital for natural resource exploitation is another 
problem for developing countries. Therefore, understanding the underlying reasons for 
corruption and the capital needs of developing countries to exploit their natural resource seems 
to be a complex endeavour which may have made it difficult for such studies to be able to 
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present a definitive and convincing conclusion. To a large extent, improved transparency and 
accountability practices could help solve the resource ‘curse’ phenomenon in ODCs. Similarly, 
other studies allude that, since EITI seeks to address possible challenges driving the NRC, 
through the implementation of policy initiatives and compliance by member countries, it is 
expected that member countries may escape the NRC. However, scores of studies show that 
EITI membership has not lived up to its expectation since the socio-economic growth of most 
member countries still leaves much to be desired.  
This paper argues that owners of capital of the oil and gas MNCs in these ODCs reserve top 
management positions to their favourite managers who may misrepresent information or alter 
reports to suit their personal and principals’ interests (Gray, 1992, 2013) at the expense of local 
community development. Accordingly, principals and owners of capital should not only see 
‘business’ as just demand, supply and pricing, but the conditions within which production, 
distribution and consumption take place. In addition, Adams et al. (2017) find that the rent and 
resource-seeking strategies being used by MNCs are central to the ‘manufactured risks’ which 
negatively impact ODCs’ economies. Whilst these countries have been inconsistent in their 
approach to effectively deal with the challenges emanating from the resource-curse 
phenomenon, MNCs in the oil and gas sector continue to extract resources and expand their 
market base without much recognition to the CSR implications of their resource extraction 
activities.  
In addition, the literature on governance and economic growth reviewed to date indicate that 
international market prices tend to fall during oil windfalls. Therefore, where revenue from oil 
windfalls are not properly saved or invested to take care of future fluctuations in oil production 
and international market prices (Papyrakis, and Gerlagh, 2006), the result is a fall in expected 
oil income needed for finance and economic planning. Therefore, where resource wealth does 
not have a corresponding increase in income, the result is the resource-curse. Though the 
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findings of these studies are significant, they fail to consider the fact that control of oil 
production has the potential to increase the world market price of oil. Hence, the absence of 
sustainability programs and an ‘invisible hand’ price increase through targeted periodic quota 
production strategies could also be attributed to the reasons for the resource-curse in ODCs. 
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2006) fail to recognise the fact that good oil resource governance could 
help improve oil revenue and reduce or avoid the resource-curse. A body of literature 
establishes that weak institutional environments can promote the resource-curse phenomenon. 
This finding was also affirmed by studies that attribute the resource-curse to the activities of 
MNCs operating within weak institutional contexts due to their increased PMA activities in a 
globalised world.   
We find MNCs’ rent-seeking behaviour and long-term licencing lobbying being driven by their 
profit maximisation agenda which contribute to the slow socio-economic growth and 
development of ODCs. Whilst rents are a perfectly good profit maximisation concept, MNCs 
in the oil and gas sector use their competitive advantage to seek excessive rents by creating 
entry barriers to sustain their hegemony (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Kolk and Lenfant, 2010). 
MNCs’ rent-seeking behaviour leads them to utilise their bargaining power to influence the 
market actors to gain and reassert their market position at the expense of CSR obligations. 
Based on the ‘resource-dependency theory’, this paper affirms that the prevalence of MNC’s 
rent-seeking behaviour and long-term licence lobbying motivates the resource curse (Kopiński 
et al., 2013). Focusing on MNCs as agents of globalisation and owners of capital in the ODCs, 
it is safe to assert that global capitalism and the profit maximisation agenda of oil and gas 
MNCs greatly contribute to the natural resource ‘curse’ phenomenon.  
Consequently, studies that focus on a firm’s CSR commitment and economic growth argue that 
a firm, and for that matter, MNCs’ CSR commitments towards effective and speedy socio-
economic growth and development cannot be underestimated. However, from the institutional 
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theory perspective, ODCs’ slow socio-economic growth and development can be attributed to 
MNCs’ CSR non-compliance, driven by weak institutional contexts (Frederick, 1992; 
Barraquier, 2011; Ferguson, 2005). This confirms that weak institutional context contributes 
to the resource-curse and makes institutional quality a significant determinant within the 
resource-curse debate. It has become apparent that even where MNCs honour their CSRs, they 
do it purposely for legitimisation (Suchman, 1995).    
Other studies also conclude that, in a bid to satisfy their PMA, MNCs constantly embark on 
rigorous transfer pricing and tax avoidance. In this regard, the transaction cost economics 
(TCE) protagonists suggest that MNCs cut costs substantially to increase profits to satisfy 
shareholders’ interests (Voegtlin et al., 2012). It is therefore, established that through TCE, 
MNCs embark on cost-cutting exercise and tax avoidance to maximise profits and facilitate 
capital flight.  
We also find that MNCs’ exclusive concern for shareholders needs when considering 
stakeholders’ needs is inadequate, as they seem to be more concerned with developing the 
human capital of expatriate senior managers and directors. This paper argues that it is critical 
for MNCs to appreciate that though debt holders and shareholders fundamentally have explicit 
claims on a firm’s success, other stakeholders have implicit claims on a firm’s wealth 
(McWilliams et al. (2006). Therefore, in considering shareholders’ interest, oil and gas MNCs 
operating in ODCs must consider government and employees’ interests, since they contribute 
positively to socio-economic growth and development (Voegtlin et al., 2012), as evidence of 
responsible global business leadership. Hence, the resource-based view theory (RBV) 
literatures argue that MNCs could help ODCs to escape the resource-curse through the creation 
of sustainable employment and continuous professional development (training) for local people 
(Peteraf 1993; Wernerfelt 1984). These arguments suggest that effective CSR practices support 
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economic value creation and equitable distribution of economic wealth for the wellbeing of 
society.  
Using Ghana as an example of one of the few ODCs that have recently joined the African oil 
producing giants, Kopiński et al. (2013) suggest that Ghana’s membership of the oil-producing 
giants has greatly raised hopes amongst the public. However, they confirm it could generate 
the anxiety and fears of a ‘Nigerian scenario’ where oil becomes a ‘curse’ instead of ‘blessing’. 
This is because researchers and policymakers do not seem to have a clear and detailed 
understanding of the pathways of failure and trajectories that some ODCs have followed and 
experienced. They argue that, whilst Ghana, as a latecomer to the oil and gas industry, might 
have acquired some structural immunity against the NRC phenomenon, a deeper understanding 
of the phenomenon is necessary. They demonstrate that since its oil discovery, Ghana has 
embarked on effective and efficient oil and gas resources management, including rigorous and 
intensive capacity building to strengthen the legal framework, improving transparency and 
accountability, along with modest attempts to strengthen the non-resource sectors of the 
economy.  
In view of these developments, they argue that considering Ghana’s stable political system, its 
relatively strong and diversified economy, and the strength of civil society - the usual 
symptoms associated with oil and gas extraction within ODCs - makes it unlikely that Ghana’s 
oil and gas resources could turn the country upside-down. However, in view of the many 
debates surrounding MNCs’ CSR commitments on the African continent, coupled with its 
weak institutional structures (Frynas and Paulo, 2007; Kolk and Lenfant, 2010 Adams et al. 
2017; Adams et al. 2018), this paper asserts that Africa is the ‘cautious continent’; it is 
important to be cautious in being optimistic about predicting its future growth prospects and 
cautious in being pessimistic about enumerating its problems. With that in mind, this paper is 
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careful in positing that the ‘natural resource curse’ phenomenon in ODCs, particularly in 
Africa, should be considered as a ‘treatable disease’.  
Besides, the wide range of literature reviewed so far, this paper takes a step further in enhancing 
our understanding of the critical drivers and implications of the NRC phenomenon. Informed 
by the comprehensive discussions, criticisms and findings, we describe the hypothesised 
phenomenon, ‘natural resource curse’, as remnants of capitalism, being the scramble for, 
exploitation, manipulation, and mismanagement of natural resources revenues (Frynas & Paulo 
2007), induced by greed and ignorance. Considering the recent case of oil-rich Ghana’s 
strengthened socio-economic position and institutional structures, and the petroleum sector 
arrangements in its preparation to advance oil production (Kopiński et al., 2013), we expect 
ODCs in sub-Saharan Africa to record improved performance and to become an exemplary 
model for ODCs. Until then, the natural resource ‘curse’ debate remains inconclusive.   
3.3 Conclusions and avenues for future research 
This study explores how, and the extent to which, the activities of MNCs operating in the oil 
and gas sector in ODCs contribute to the natural resource ‘curse’ phenomenon; and how 
MNCs’ ethical practices could avert the ‘curse’ or possibly bring about advantages of natural 
resource abundance for ODCs in order to support sustainable socio-economic growth and 
development. We conclude that globalisation, with respect to MNCs’ activities, contributes 
greatly to the natural resource ‘curse’. Key factors such as MNCs’ profit maximisation agenda 
(capitalism) and institutional weakness within ODCs contribute significantly to the natural 
resource ‘curse’. Other factor such as MNCs’ CSR non-compliance, transfer pricing, tax 
avoidance and evasion, rent-seeking behaviour, legitimisation and lobbying ambitions, 
petroleum revenue mismanagement, employment and HCD practices, executive compensation 
schemes, company ownership structure and capital flight, all work to impede the socio-
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economic growth and development of ODCs. It is in this regard that Du and Vieira (2012) 
allude that the controversial nature of the oil industry drives MNCs to adopt various strategies 
to undertake CSR activities just to gain legitimacy.  
We show that even though oil MNCs operating in some ODCs may have brought modest 
growth results, somewhere in the late 20th century, MNCs’ CSR non-compliance might have 
affected the expected meaningful contribution to the socio-economic growth of these countries. 
This finding confirms Collier and Gunning (1999) who show that MNC’s activities within 
ODCs explain the poor socio-economic performance of these countries. A critical examination 
of the ‘resource-dependence theory’ shows that globalisation, and for that matter, MNCs’ 
capitalist ideologies, contribute immensely to the slow socio-economic growth and 
development in ODCs (Sachs and Warner 1995, 2001). Based on these contextual 
circumstances, one could argue that MNCs’ activities might ether contribute insignificantly 
towards the socio-economic growth of ODCs or might be responsible for the ODCs’ slow 
socio-economic growth and development. 
We recommend some policy directions. Resource-rich developing countries may use the 
financial systems to mobilise funds (capital) to wean themselves from over-reliance on foreign 
capital (economic dependency theory) for their resource exploitation. ODCs must not focus 
only on attracting MNCs into their economies to provide capital and employment. We argue 
that a well-developed financial system would serve as a primary source of capital and 
technology transfer. It would promote human capital development and increase economic 
productivity without the associated risks that MNCs bring due to their profit maximisation 
agenda. As long as ODCs continue to depend on MNCs for their resource exploitation, they 
would continue to be exploited and the resource-curse debate would continue. However, if 
ODCs strategise to manage and own their rich natural resources, then it is possible the natural 
resource ‘curse’ debate would be a thing of the past.   
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Whilst we recommend that ODCs should set policies which provide effective methods for 
responsible exploitation of oil resources and revenue management, MNCs must be directed to 
support environmental preservation and sustainable development programmes. From the 
MNCs side, policy could be reformed to include assessing the quality of investments and 
intensity of production, whereas host ODCs could explore opportunities for oil-revenue 
management aimed at building a sustainable economy to help escape oil-dependent economic 
crisis. They may also reduce their overreliance on oil revenue for lasting economic planning 
and development. Countries could adopt a long-term national development plan to accumulate 
capital to exploit their own resources and wean themselves from being owned and managed by 
MNCs. They may amend current natural resource management and governance regulations and 
policies to incorporate MNCs’ legal, mandated and voluntary CSR requirements which include 
regular monitoring and inspection of MNCs’ CSR compliance reports. National CSR laws and 
regulatory policy must enjoin MNCs to incorporate their CSRs into their firms’ policy 
framework as a mandatory requirement. Policy direction should focus on minimising 
capitalists’ profit maximising agenda. Concerning institutional quality, we suggest ODCs 
update and strengthen existing legal, regulatory and judicial systems as well as policy 
frameworks governing all institutional bodies and environments, particularly the oil and gas 
sector, supported by the rule of law. They may have strong international oil market (pricing) 
representation. They may have policy direction on periodic quota production and utilising, 
reprocessing or converting all oil-related by-products into economic use.   
If ODCs commit to having strong institutions, and MNCs’ commit to earnest CSR compliance, 
coupled with quality measures, committed leadership and political will, the natural resource 
‘curse’ debate could become be a thing of the past. Considering the similarities of the resource-
curse and the ‘Dutch Disease’, we could have considered other literature to explain how price 
and productivity fluctuations could cause the ‘Dutch Disease’. Additionally, we could have 
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considered wider studies on the sustainability of natural resource usage to consolidate our 
argument on the effect of the resource windfall on a non-replaceable asset.  These are areas for 
future research.  
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Table 1. Extant literature on traditional/country-based causes of the natural resource-curse  
Author(s) Year  Country  Sample  Method  Conceptual 
underpinnings  
Key findings  
Kasekende et al.  
 
 
 
 
2016 
 
 
 
 
76 countries 
 
 
 
 
76 countries that are rich 
in hydrocarbon and 
mineral resources 
Use panel data estimation techniques 
for the first decade of the EITI’s 
existence (2002–2012) based on the 
worldwide governance indicators 
(WGI) of EITI membership 
Corruption 
 
They find that countries join EITI to signal 
their commitment to greater transparency. 
Corruption scores have not reduced in EITI 
member countries. 
Kolstad and 
Wiig  
 
 
 
 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Use EITI 
 
 
 
 
 
Use EITI as the sample 
and Freedom House data 
of the press as 
transparency proxy 
 
Using regression, they draw on both 
economic theory and other empirical 
studies to systematically test, review 
and analyse the association between 
corruption and transparency within 
resource-rich developing countries 
They find that education is key to process, 
understand and act on information. 
Öge 
 
 
 
2016 
 
 
 
Azerbaijan 
Indonesia and 
Zambia 
 
Azerbaijan Indonesia and 
Zambia 
 
Uses interrupted time series and panel 
data analyses between 2006 and 2013 
 
 
Though EITI membership improved 
aggregate data disclosure in member 
countries during this period, he however, 
finds no change in corruption perceptions  
Arezki and 
Brückner  
 
 
 
2011 
 
 
 
 
30 oil-
exporting 
countries 
 
 
30 oil-exporting 
countries 
 
 
 
Use a panel of 30 oil-exporting 
countries from 1992–2005 
 
 
 
They conclude that oil rents increase 
increases corruption massively, affects 
political rights instability but at the same time 
improves civil liberties. 
 
 
 
Standing  
 
 
 
2014 
 
 
 
Ghana  
 
 
 
 
Ghana’s petroleum sector 
 
 
 
Uses empirical/field study 
Transparency 
and 
accountability 
Found that the normal antidotes prescribed by 
the development community of transparency 
and social accountability may not solve the 
resource-curse problem. The policy has been 
ineffective due to local corruption and lack of 
accountability. 
Adams et al. 
(2018) 
2018 Ghana  Use 222 cases from 18 of 
Ghana's key petroleum 
stakeholders 
They use 222 cases from 18 of Ghana's 
key petroleum stakeholders to 
investigate possible natural resource 
curse escape factors 
They find transparency and EITI membership 
insufficient to avert its ‘resource-curse’ 
unless they are complemented with quality of 
institutions, quality of governance, 
government effectiveness, accountability, 
corruption control mechanisms, natural 
38 
 
resource sustainability and effective 
accounting practices. 
Sovacool and 
Andrews  
2015 Azerbaijan 
and Liberia. 
Azerbaijan and Liberia They empirically test the supposed 
benefits of the EITI by qualitatively 
assessing the performance of 
Azerbaijan and Liberia. 
Governance They find that attributing governance 
improvements causality to the EITI is a 
misconception  
Sachs and 
Warner  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 developing 
countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 developing countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They use regression in explorative 
cross-country study  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional 
quality  
They find no relationship between 
institutional quality and natural resource 
curse. 
They find economies with a high ratio of 
natural resource exports to GDP in 1971 to 
have low growth rates during the subsequent 
period 1971-89 
 
Mehlum et al.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 countries 
 
 
 
 
Nigeria, Zambia, Sierra 
Leone, 
Angola, Saudi Arabia 
and Venezuela,  
Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong Singapore, 
Botswana, Canada, 
Australia, and 
Norway 
They empirically test resource curse 
theory building on Sachs and Warner 
(1995)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
They find that abundant natural resources 
reduce aggregate income within institutional 
grabber-friendly environments, whilst a 
higher level of resources increased income in 
institutional producer-friendly environments 
van der Ploeg  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Iran, 
Venezuela, 
Libya, 
Iraq, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Nigeria 
 
 
Low-income countries  
Middle-income countries  
High-income OECD 
countries  
 
Uses empirical study – survey on a 
variety of hypotheses including World 
Development Indicators, 2004, World 
Bank 
 
 
 
 
Rent-seeking 
behaviour  
He discovers that a resource boom engenders 
rent-seeking behaviour and civil conflict 
within weak institutional contexts. 
 
 
 
 
Bhattacharyy 
and Hodler  
2010 
 
 
 
 
124 countries Use 124 sampled 
countries 
Based on the game theory, use panel 
data covering the period 1980–2004 and 
124 countries to test this theoretical 
prediction. 
Rent-seeking 
behaviour 
They find that the relationship between 
resource rents and corruption depends on the 
quality of the democratic institutions. 
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 Source: Compiled by the authors 
 
Table 2. Literature on globalisation/multinational corporation activities induced resource-curse school of thought   
Author(s) Year  Country  Sample  Method  Conceptual 
underpinnings  
Key findings  
Ferguson  
 
 
 
 
2005 
 
 
 
 
Conceptual 
study 
 
 
 
Conceptual study 
 
 
 
 
Uses empirical studies to analyse 
James Scott (1988) Seeing Like a 
State 
 
 
CSR 
commitment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
He finds that recent capital investment (multinational 
oil companies) in oil-rich African countries is 
territorialized and drive selectively territorialized 
investment 
 
 
Nyuur et al. 
 
 
 
 
2016 
 
 
 
 
Ghana  
 
 
 
227 sample 
Ghanaian local 
firms 
 
 
Use results of hierarchical 
regression analysis of data from 227 
sample Ghanaian local firms 
 
They find substantial improvement in local firms’ 
CSR uptake with corresponding improvement in FDI 
inflow 
 
 
Jamali 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lebanon 
 
 
 
 
 
Uses purposeful 
sampling 
methodology to 
select  
10 well-known 
subsidiaries of 
MNCs in Lebanon 
Uses interpretive research 
methodology to examine the CSR 
orientations of MNC subsidiaries  
 
 
 
 
Discovers diffusion and dilution of global CSR 
patterns in developing countries regarding specific 
subsidiary endowments and host market 
characteristics. 
 
 
 
Kolk and 
Lenfant  
 
 
 
 
Amaeshi et al 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 
 
Central African 
countries  
 
 
 
 
 
Nigeria 
 
Angola, 
DR Congo, and 
Republic of  
Congo 
 
 
 
Fidelity Bank, 
Nigeria 
Use secondary data (company 
information) 
 
 
 
 
 
An explorative case study on 
Fidelity Bank, Nigeria 
They find most MNCs report on their economic and 
social impacts. They also find MNCs’ CSR report to 
be generic and high CSR vulnerability 
 
 
 
 
Find CSR in developing countries being 
characterised by institutional weakness 
40 
 
Odera et al.  
 
2016 
 
 
Nigeria 
 
Nigerian oil 
companies. 
 
The study analyses annual reports 
through content analysis 
 
 
CSR Find Nigeria’s MNCs’ oil business presents low 
quality social and environmental disclosures.  
 
García‐
Rodríguez et al. 
2013 Angola  Luanda oil refinery 
in Angola. 
They use case study to examine the 
use of an environmental 
management system (EMS) in 
Luanda oil refinery in Angola. 
They find that MNCs CSR commitment would be a 
great asset to socio-economic growth and 
development of ODCs if MNCs integrate CSR into 
their business strategy 
Suchman  
 
 
 
 
1995 
 
 
 
 
Conceptual  
study 
 
 
 
Large literature 
review on 
legitimacy  
 
 
Synthesizes and analyses large but 
diverse literature on organizational 
legitimacy 
 
 
Legitimacy  Identifies three primary forms of legitimacy: 
pragmatic, based on audience self-interest; moral, 
based on normative approval: and cognitive, based 
on comprehensibility and ‘taken-for-grantedness’ 
 
Du and Vieira  2012 United States 
and UK 
6 oil companies  Adopt a case study methodology to 
analyse 6 oil companies’ 2011–
2012 web site content 
Find all six companies studied using CSR activities 
to address the needs of various stakeholders  
Sikka  
 
 
2010 
 
 
 Conceptual 
study 
 
Conceptual study 
 
 
Adopt transaction cost economics 
for investigative study 
 
Transfer pricing 
and Tax 
avoidance  
MNCs promise of responsible conduct, however they 
end up practising tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
 
Sikka and 
Willmott 
 
 
2010 
 
 
 
Conceptual 
study 
 
 
Conceptual study 
 
 
 
Adopt transaction cost economics 
for investigative study 
 
 
Find transfer pricing misrepresenting the real values 
of transactions, driving wealth -retention processes 
and facilitates a firm’s tax avoidance, engendering 
capital flight 
Sikka  
 
 
 
 
2003 
 
 
 
 
Jersey, a UK 
Crown 
Dependency,  
 
 
Jersey, a UK 
Crown 
Dependency, 
protected by the 
UK government 
Uses empirical study – case study 
 
 
 
 
Finds that capitalism is inherently crisis-ridden since 
MNCs utilise offshore financial centres (OFCs; also 
called tax havens 
 
 
Contractor 2016 US, UK and 
China 
MNCs of 
European, western 
and eastern 
countries 
Uses empirical studies  Finds that MNCs use tax avoidance techniques to 
remain in the global business competition behaviour 
Kopiński et al. 
 
2013 
 
Ghana  
 
Oil and gas sector 
 
Adopt empirical study  
 
Rent-seeking 
behaviour  
Find oil-rich developing countries more vulnerable 
to MNCs’ oil and gas revenue ‘rent-seeking 
41 
 
Idemudia 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 
Nigeria  Oil Producing Area 
Development 
Commissions 
Draws on empirical data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oil Producing Area Development Commissions 
failed to improve the lives of the people in oil-
producing communities due to their failure to amend 
opportunities and incentives for rent seekers and 
allow for active community and civil society 
participation. 
Jensen and 
Meckling 
 
 
 
 
1976  
 
 
 
 
 
Conceptual 
study 
 
 
 
 
Conceptual study 
 
 
 
 
 
Conceptual study 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive 
compensation, 
ownership 
structure and 
capital flight 
They find that managerial power and discretion 
facilitate high executive compensation which is part 
of the agency problem itself 
 
 
 
Minnick and 
Rosenthal  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All S&P 500 firms 
over the 
period 2003–2007, 
sample are banking, 
utilities, insurance, 
energy, retail, 
manufacturing and 
technology 
 
Use proxy statements, to hand-
collect information about restricted 
stock grants 
 
 
 
 
 
Find that MNCs’ ownership structure, and design of 
consistently high executive compensation 
arrangements had implications on MNCs’ CSR 
commitments, cash flow, dividend pay-outs and 
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Figure 1: Theoretical background/ conceptual framework 
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